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1 Introduction
A simple truth about judicial systems is that courts exercise judgment about legislation and
refrain from enforcing it when they deem it su¢ ciently unlikely to be appropriate. Unlike
the proverbial sport umpire who merely calls balls and strikes, judges evaluate the rules
of the gamebefore applying them to concrete cases. Judicial deference to the legislator
is therefore not automatic. We want to understand why that matters and then derive
economic implications. Our starting point is that the legislation conveys information to
courts about its own appropriateness. Each statute contains useful information for courts
to decide whether to defer to the legislator or not. Hence the probability that a statute will
be enforced in court is endogenous to the statute itself. This has non-trivial implications
to the interaction between written legislation and court decisions. This paper proposes a
model to study this issue.
In the model, Bayesian adjudicators are imperfectly informed about an issue. The leg-
islation yields a clear implication, but it is not clear whether it has been appropriately
designed.1 Adjudicators use their prior knowledge to assess the legislation. Formally, they
learn about the type of legislator. The largest the distance between the legislation and
what an adjudicator would expect from a good legislator, the largest is the likelihood that
the statute was enacted by a bad legislator. As a result, the legislation is discarded if it
is su¢ ciently distant from the adjudicators prior beliefs.
In equilibrium, courts will often enforce legislation as intended by legislators even if it
does not reect the courtspreferred policy choice; occasionally, however, courts will make
a judgment call and overrule the legislator.2 The paper highlights two key implications of
the model, one related to the probability of statutory enforcement and the other concerning
the e¤ect of legislation on legal uncertainty.
The rst implication can be stated as follows: the enactment of legislation specifying
that parties cannot do something raises the probability that courts will allow related things
not expressly forbidden. In simple words, the enactment of a prohibition can in practice
create a permission. We use usury laws to illustrate this insight. A statutory interest rate
ceiling not only makes it more likely that courts will invalidate contracts with interest rates
above the cap, but it can also make it more likely that courts will validate contracts with
interest rates below the legislated cap.
Intuitively, it goes like this. Absent usury laws, very high interest rates are not prohib-
1We are thus assuming away the problem of statutory ambiguity, a legal scholarsfavorite that is however not our concern
here.
2We realize that courts almost always speak in terms of deference even when they are failing to do so, but we are concerned
with the substance rather than the rhetoric of court decisions.
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ited. However, if courts deem a contract with interest rates of, say, 1000% unconscionable,
the absence of an interest rate cap will be considered inappropriate. Courts would then de-
ne an interest rate cap at, say, 40%. Now, contrast this situation with one where Congress
enacted a statute capping interest rates at 50%. If the courts best judgment is that the ap-
propriate interest rate cap is 40%, a legislated cap of 50% raises little disagreement (whereas
the absence of any ceiling generates a much greater level of disagreement). In other words,
courts attribute a larger probability to the legislation being good. Hence the same court
that would impose a 40% interest rate if legislation allowed any interest rate, would uphold
the legislated 50% interest rate cap.
Notice the surprising outcome. In both cases, legislation permits the 45% contract (in
the rst case because there is no legislated cap and in the second because the cap is set at
50%). Yet, with no ceiling, courts invalidate the 45% contract whereas with a 50% ceiling,
courts validate it. As such, a 45% interest rate contract, while legislatively permitted in
both scenarios, would only be deemed valid where there is a legislated cap of 50%. As
can be seen, the existence of a celling changes how courts regulate transactions that are
not expressly forbidden. This is how the enactment of a statutory prohibition can create a
court permission.
The economic implication is that carefully crafted usury laws can cause credit markets
to expand, rather than retract. By increasing the courts tolerance for higher levels of
interest rates, a legislated ceiling would sway judges into permitting more loans, leading
credit markets to expand.
Just like a statutory prohibition can raise the probability that courts permit things
that are not statutorily prohibited (such as contracting with higher interest rates), the
enactment of legislation permitting something may raise the probability that judges will
prohibit related things not expressly permitted. To go back to the same example, in the
presence of a legislated interest rate ceiling of 3% (too low) courts will probably overrule the
legislator and apply their best judgment so as to place the threshold at 40%. But suppose
the legislature replaces the 3% with a 35% interest cap, a generous legislative permission.
Now the legislated cap raises much less disagreement and is strictly enforced by courts. The
interest rates tolerated by courts, however, paradoxically drop from 40% to 35%. So while
the new usury law expressly extended the permission for parties to contract interest rates
in the range of 3-35%, its actual e¤ect was to prohibit contracts in the range of 35-40%.
Here, the enactment of a permission in practice created a prohibition. These results can be
visualized in Figure 1.
The model is rst employed to study usury laws, but our conclusions apply beyond that,
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Legislated ceiling Prevailing ceiling Legislated ceiling Prevailing ceiling
None 40% 50% (down) 50% (up)
Legislated ceiling Prevailing ceiling Legislated ceiling Prevailing ceiling
3% 40% 35% (up) 35% (down)
Permitting prohibition
Prohibiting permission
Figure 1: Permitting prohibition and prohibiting permission
as discussed and exemplied later.
The second insight from the model is that the dispersion of court decisions tends to be
greater with legislation that commands little deference from courts, than with legislation
that commands none. Technically, this means that the relationship between the variance
of decisions and some measure of the degree of disagreement of the median judge with
the legislation is non-monotonic. Assuming that greater judicial dereference is a proxy for
better legislation, the implication is that within a certain range, legislative improvement
trades-o¤ with legal certainty.
To grasp the intuition, contrast these two situations. First, an interest rate cap is
legislated at a completely unreasonable level. For example, it is too low (3%) or too high
(3000%). In either of these cases, all courts will reject the legislation (the likelihood that the
legislation is appropriate will be considered too low). Thus the ceiling will be ignored (say,
a very low ceiling is deemed an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract; a
very high ceiling permits too many unconscionable loans). As such, courts validate contracts
with interest rates above the unreasonably low legislated cap, or invalidate contracts with
interest rates below the unreasonably high interest rate legislated cap. Either way, the
legislator is overruled and a court-imposed interest rate cap arises as a byproduct of the
court decisions. This cap is dispersed (say between 25% and 250%).
In the alternative scenario, the cap is legislated at a point deemed unreasonable by the
majority of judges, but not by all. For example, the legislated cap is either very low(15%)
or very high (300%), so some courts uphold these caps but most of them are deciding
according to their own judgment calls. Crucially, courts that uphold the 15% interest rate
ceiling are those that would otherwise choose a ceiling close to 25%; those which would
choose a higher ceiling would consider the 15% cap inappropriate.
As a result, compared to a situation with a 3% interest rate ceiling, the 15% cap raises
legal uncertainty because a credit contract with a 20% interest rate is subject to legal
uncertainty in the latter case (some courts uphold the 15% ceiling) but not in the former
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case (all courts ignore the 3% ceiling).3 These results can be visualized in Figure 2.
Legislated ceiling Range of prevailing ceilings
3% 25-250%
3000% 25-250%





Figure 2: Legislation and legal uncertainty
Generalizing, when legislation is completely within the zone of acceptance, no judge
discards it so the variance of court decisions is small. When the legislation is completely
outside the zone of acceptance, every judge discards it and the variance is large. And
when the legislation is considered acceptable by few judges only, the variance is even greater,
very large. Hence one message of the paper is that institutional mechanisms (such as
stare decisis) that moderate dispersion and reduce legal uncertainty become more important
as courts become more active in their task of double-checking misguided legislation.
The remainder of this introduction discusses the related literature. Section 2 provides
examples of the interplay between credit market legislation and court decisions that conrm
our main assumption. Section 3 describes our model of adjudication and demonstrates its
implication for the enforcement of legislated prohibitions. Section 4 applies this result to
a simple economy with usury laws. Section 5 discusses other examples and applications.
Section 6 discusses the problem of legal uncertainty. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
The fact that courts exercise judgment and some level of discretion in interpreting legislation
has been known for a long time. Landes and Posner (1975) argued that courts tend to
interpret statutes in much the same way that they interpret contracts. In contract law,
the basic cannon for interpretation is the intention of the parties; similarly, courts interpret
legislation in accordance with the original legislative understanding. Landes and Posners
reasoning infers court motives from results, and goes like this: if courts habitually placed
3Similarly, the courts that uphold the 300% legislated interest rate ceiling are those that would otherwise choose a ceiling
close to 250%, as those who would choose a lower ceiling would reject the null hypothesis that the 300% cap is appropriate. As
a result, compared to a situation with a 3000% interest rate ceiling, the 300% legislated cap raises legal uncertainty because
a credit contract with a 280% interest rate is subject to legal uncertainty in the latter case (some courts uphold the 300%
ceiling) but not in the former case (all courts ignore the 3000% ceiling).
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their will above that of legislators, legislative bargains would be worth very little, so courts
would e¤ectively reduce the rents available to the legislators that prot from brokering
the sale of legislation to interest groups. Such an arrangement would be of no interest
to legislators and politicians in general, so the latter structure the judicial system in a
way that insulates judges from the results of the cases they decide. Judges generally have
tenure, xed remuneration and few prospects of promotion. Having nothing to gain from
being creative, courts presumably go along with legislators and enforce the political deals
incorporated in legislation.
The Landes and Posners argument was framed as a positive account a description of,
but not a prescription to, courts. Indeed, theirs is a testable hypothesis, but the supporting
evidence is weak (Macey, 1986). Nevertheless, the enduring force of the Landes and Posners
proposition rests on its implied normative message, namely that in interpreting statutes
courts should abide by the intention of the legislators because otherwise they will not only
thwart the political system, but also increase legal uncertainty. This idea is developed
in Easterbrook (1984). Alternative economic conceptions over the normatively desirable
interpretative court strategy were formulated over time. Noticeably, Macey (1986) argued
that courts should interpret statutes not as contracts but in a manner consistent with
the stated public-regarding purpose of each statute, the objective being not to completely
prevent interest groups from inuencing lawmaking, but to raise the cost for doing so.
Other inuential normative conceptions in this debate include those of Eskridge (1987) and
Farber and Frickey (1991).
The di¢ culties in coming up with a denitive economic benchmark for statutory inter-
pretation helps explain why more recent work accepts (often implicitly) that some legal
issues are amenable to a range of reasonable views that do not necessarily represent errors.
Their approach can be framed more as exercises in social choice theory rather than in law
and economics, because the focus is less on proposing e¢ cient solutions to legal dilemmas
and more on aggregating the di¤erent views of judges into a controlling conception.
Finding this controlling conception, however, is not easy, because the question of what
judges maximize?has proven to be quite problematic (Cooter, 1983; Posner, 1993, 2005).
Limited evidence exists that in adjudicating cases judges maximize expected monetary
(Anderson, Shughart II and Tollison, 1989; Toma, 1991) or political gains (Cohen, 1991;
Morriss et al., 2005; Choi and Gulati, 2004), so judicial motivation remains a conundrum
for theories that regard judges as strictly self-seeking actors (Epstein, 1990; Kornhauser,
1992a). To deal with this problem, even authors identied with the tradition of law and eco-
nomics had to embrace richer versions of judicial utility. Richard Posner, for example, later
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analogized judges to nonprot enterprises, voters and spectators at theatrical performances
to construct judicial utility as a function of leisure, prestige, reputation, self-respect, the
intrinsic pleasure of the work, and even the other satisfactions that people seek in a job
(2008, p. 36; Epstein et al., 2013).
Some authors rene these ideas by distinguishing judicial utility that is derived from
case dispositions (Badawi and Baker 2015; Cameron et al, 2000; Cameron and Kornhauser,
2006; Carrubba and Clark, 2012; Fischman, 2011; Cameron and Kornhauser 2015; Lax,
2003; Callander and Clark, 2013; Beim et al, 2014) and policies (Kornhauser 1992a, 1992b,
1995), or by empirically testing or factoring into the model institutional details of courts
such as collegial and group decision-making (Kornhauser and Sager, 1986, 1993; Stearns,
2000) and panel composition e¤ects (Revesz, 1997; Cross and Tiller, 1998; Sunstein et al.
2004). Recently, some studies documented the e¤ects of other factors such as the presence
of salient facts (Bordalo et al., 2015) and opinion authorship (Farhang et al., 2015).
Alternatively, authors drawing on the tradition of positive political theory focused on
the role of the judiciary in shaping policy rather than on judicial utility (e.g. Miller and
Moe, 1983; McCubbins et al., 1987, 1989). While most studies focused on the e¤ects of
substantive policy preferences that are based on the judges ideology (e.g., Segal, 1989; Mar-
tin and Quinn, 2002) and prejudices (Kastellec, 2013; Martin and Pyle, 2000; Sen, 2015),
others focused on the interactions between the judiciary and other branches of government
(Ferejohn and Shipan, 1990; Gely and Spiler, 1990, 1992; Eskridge and Ferejohn, 1992). In
a seminal article focusing specically on statutory interpretation, Ferejohn and Weingast
(1992) proposed that judicial interpretations reect the strategic setting in which they are
announced. In passing legislation, legislatures calculate the risk of court invalidation; simi-
larly, courts decisions reect the external political reality, for failing to take it into account
can always trigger the enactment of new legislation that rebu¤s the courtsposition.4
Our approach is more closely related to Baker and Kornhauser (2015), who also build
a model of judicial deference. However, they study whether an appellate court wants to
impose its judgment over a possibly biased trial court that has more factual information,
while here, facts are known and the question is whether the legislation is appropriate. The
model structure and applications are also very di¤erent.
The model developed herein crucially also advances a proposition about the dispersion
4 In the spirit of rational choice theory, ours is a positive model of adjudication, especially in the sense that we advance no
claims as to when courts should reject or enforce a legislated prohibition. But we do not see ourselves as writing the tradition
of political positive theory because we are not concerned with the broader workings of the political system but rather with
drawing economic implications from the adjudication model. The parallels with positive political theory are anecdotal at
best: Ferejohn and Weingast (1992) posited the existence of a set of politically viable court interpretations, which are those
that are stable because they do not provoke a legislative response. Similarly, our model shows that once a judicial prohibition
has been established, the permitted zone can be enlarged with legislation that creates not too large of a disagreement by the
courts.
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of court decisions. This resonates with a discussion of legal uncertainty, which has been
regarded as an economic problem for a long time. Famously, Max Weber (1922) went as
far as to attribute the very emergence of capitalism in part to the ability of continental
European legal systems to foster calculabilitythrough the rational codication of law.5
More recently, this view has been questioned, but just in part. The law and nance literature
promoted the hypothesis that judge-made Common Law systems are better for nancial
development and economic growth than the Civil Law tradition that so captivated Weber
(LaPorta et al., 1997, 1998; Botero et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2000).
Yet, even in the United States, statutes enacted by legislatures have now become the
primary source of law (Calabresi, 1982). Moreover, the notion that predictable courts are
important for economic rationality and market coordination continues to loom large in
economic thinking. It nds particular resonance in transactions costs economics (Coase,
1991; Williamson, 1999) and in some strands of the literature on law and development
(Dam, 2006; Cooter and Schaefer, 2012).
In the modern law and economics literature, however, legal uncertainty has only been
a derivative topic. The tradition in the eld is to subsume legal uncertainty into the
more normative-oriented category of legal error. Indeed, the typical exercise in economic
analysis of law is normative in character: an e¢ cient benchmark is proposed and the non-
conforming court decisions are treated as errors (Schwartz and Beckner III, 1998). With
few exceptions (e.g. Rhee, 2012; Rasmusen and Ramseyer, 2010; Salama, 2012), legal
uncertainty is then framed as a byproduct of error, and the prospects of more errors in
adjudication entail the prospects of greater legal uncertainty.6 Our contribution in this
paper is di¤erent, as we are concerned with the interplay between legislation and legal
uncertainty.
To sum up, economic research on judicial decisions has largely focused on understanding
judicial preferences. The focal question is whether courts are motivated by strictly legal
reasons or by non-legal concerns such as ideology or self-interest. In this paper, we take
a di¤erent route. We want to understand how the information conveyed by a piece of
legislation about its own appropriateness a¤ects court decisions.
5For Weber, the other major contribution of the legal systems to the emergence of capitalism was the development sub-
stantive legal provisions amenable to a market economy, especially those establishing freedom of contract. See Trubek (1972).
See also Kaelber (2004) for discussion of Webers views on usury laws.
6The merger between legal uncertainty and legal error can be visualized, for example, in the discussion of accuracy in
adjudication (Kaplow and Shavell, 1994, 1996). Take accident law for example, where the literature posits that courts are
increasingly inaccurate as they depart from incentivizing optimal care. If increasing accuracy in adjudication were costless,
courts would always decide cases correctly. But courts can only pursue accuracy up to a point, because more accuracy requires
more information, which comes at a cost. Thus, courts make mistakes (that is, decide cases inaccurately). Legal uncertainty
arises because in light of the prospects of court mistakes, individuals vary in their perception about how much they must
invest in compliance in order to avoid liability. As a result, they may be over-deterred in benecial activities or under-deterred
in harmful activities (Craswell and Calfee, 1986; Polinsky and Shavell, 1989; Schinkel and Tuinstra, 2006).
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2 Judicial deference to usury laws
A discussion of statutory prohibitions based on usury laws may at rst seem odd, not least
because for centuries these laws have been denounced as counterproductive and wasteful
(Turgot, 1770; Bentham, 1818; Mill, 1909).7 Yet usury laws endure almost everywhere.
Interest rate caps can still be found even in the books of developed countries such as Japan
(Ramseyer, 2013), most countries in the European Union (Reifner and Schröder, 2012), and
several states in the United States (Geisst, 2013). The topic of interest rate ceilings is still
relevant for actual policy debates.
Moreover, in the backdrop of the apparent anti-usury laws consensus of the economics
profession, there are theories proposing these laws have welfare enhancing properties. Stiglitz
andWeiss (1981), Posner (1995) and Coco and De Meza (2009) portray usury laws as a rem-
edy for borrowersmoral hazard. Bar-Gill (2004) argues that usury laws can be a means
to neutralize certain consumersbehavioral biases. More imaginatively, Barzel (1997, p.
170) frames such laws as a mechanism to avoid overconsumption of public goods by saving
on court costs. Besides that, studies focused on economic history portrayed usury laws as
substitutes for incomplete insurance markets (Posner, 1980; Carr and Landa, 1983; and
Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1998).8
Our model shows that in some cases the enactment of a usury law can serve the pur-
pose of increasing the availability of credit and the interest cap e¤ectively prevailing. Thus
this model can also be conceived as a novel justication for the enactment of carefully
drafted usury laws. But unlike previous attempts, our justication is procedural rather
than substantive in nature. Here the occasional desirability of usury ceilings does not rest
on the properties of the ceilings themselves (in reducing moral hazard, biases, exploita-
tion or whatever). Rather, usury laws may be desirable because of the interplay between
legislators and courts in the specic situations where the former enact usury ceilings that
paradoxically increase (rather than decrease) the interest rates that are tolerated by the
latter and e¤ectively prevails.9
7Earlier works helped to break the ancient prejudice against interest rates. See Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and
Peace (1625, 1901, p. 155-6), linking interest rates with credit risk and opportunity cost, and delinking it from natural law
(The ve shillings commission which a banker, for instance, charges upon every hundred pounds, is not so much an interest
in addition to ve per cent, as a compensation for his trouble, and for the risk and inconvenience he incurs,by the loan of his
money, which he might have employed in some other lucrative way [. . . ] Those human laws, which allow a compensation
to be made for the use of money or any other thing, are neither repugnant to natural nor revealed law). See also Claudius
Salmasius, De usuris liber, Lugd. Batavor.: Ex o¢ cina Elseviriorum, 1638 (treating money-lending as a business similar to
any other).
8Economists have also o¤ered explanations for usury laws based on their political economy and distributive e¤ects (Ekelund
et al., 1989; Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2010). Others have looked at the impacts of usury laws on credit markets (Eichengreen,
1984; Bodenhorn, 2007; Temin and Voth, 2008). Still other works have discussed the theoretical conditions under which legal
restrictions to private contracts can enhance e¢ ciency (Aghion & Hermalin, 1990; Bar -Gill, 2015; Schwartz, 1995).
9Usury laws (or any other prohibition) might be enacted as a response to some form of market failure or bounded rationality,
but our goal is to discuss the possibility of usury laws serving as permitting prohibitions (or asprohibiting permissions),
and the inclusion of market failures or limited rationality in the model would not change its positive implications.
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The most fundamental premise of the model is that legislated policies that seem rea-
sonable to courts are more likely to be followed. Thus, the odds of judicial deference go
down as the courts increase their level of disagreement with legislation. This proposition
is intuitive and much could be o¤ered to empirically support it. A discussion of litigation
within Brazilian credit markets o¤ers two examples that empirically ground this proposition
specically in the context of the validity of contractual interest rates.
The rst example arose in a situation where courts rejected Brazils current legislated
policy of exempting nancial institutions from interest rate caps.10 Salama (2017) used a
text-mining algorithm to look at 888 court cases where debtors questioned the validity of
interest rate charges in auto loans. He found that courts were increasingly prone to favor
debtors as the contractsinterest rates rose, despite the legislated policy of no interest rate
ceilings. The results suggested that judges sometimes nd contractual interest rates too
high. Since it is not written anywhere what too highmeans, that depends on judgment
calls by the judges.
The other example has to do with the opposite situation, where rather than rejecting a
legislated policy deemed too lenientcourts reject a legislated policy deemed too strict.
The Brazilian constitution of 1988 originally established that real interest rates [...] shall
not exceed 12% per year. In a country with a history of chronic ination (and with
hyperination when the constitution was enacted) an interest rate ceiling of 12% per year
would not only have been ine¤ectual, but could also have been fatal to the solvency of the
whole nancial system. The constitutional provision was sure to be inappropriate. Wisely,
the Brazilian Supreme Court held that the legislated ceiling was merely a constitutional
ambition; not an actionable rule. In so doing, it e¤ectively failed to defer to the legislator.11
Noticeably, the notion that courts may play an important role in dening maximum
acceptable interest rates is not a typically Brazilian phenomenon. For one, even where the
legislation contains no express interest rate ceiling courts in di¤erent jurisdictions routinely
resort to doctrines such as anatocism, extortionate credit bargainand unconscionabil-
ity12 to invalidate contracts with interest rates deemed as excessive. Sometimes, courts
will go as far as to establish detailed tests, as in the case of Germany where the Supreme
Court upholds a presumption that interest rates are contrary to good morals when they
exceed double the relevant market rate (Reifner and Schröder, 2012).
Court rejection of usury ceilings deemed inappropriately low is also not specic to Brazil.
10To be precise, in Brazil both nancial and non-nancial institutions are subject to caps on default interest rates. However,
nancial institutions are not subject to legislated caps on interest rates before default.
11 It took another fteen years for the usury ceiling to be scrapped from the constitutional text.
12Unconscionability is the doctrine prevailing in the United States. See Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, § 4.28, at 314 (3d
ed. 1999) (analyzing the doctrine of unconscionability as invoked by consumers). The unconscionability doctrine has been
legislated and appears in U.C.C. § 2-302 and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208.
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Consider for instance the fate of several state interest rate ceilings in the United States.
During the 20th century the scope of these ceilings was continually reduced through court
interpretation, often on the legal grounds that interest statutes were in derogation of the
common law and should be strictly construed (Shanks, 1930).13 Later, in 1978 the United
States Supreme Court14 held that these state interest caps (which became very problematic
when ination rose) could not be enforced on national banks that were based in other
states.15 National banks could then circumvent state ceilings by basing themselves in a
no-ceiling or high-ceiling state, as is now common (Saunders and Cohen, 2004). Other
examples include the case of Canada, where it is a crime to charge yearly interest rates
above 60% but the legislation is rarely applied to payday lenders where charges are much
higher (Howell, 2005).
This is not to say that legislated usury ceiling are simply toothless for example, the
French criminal usury statute is said to have substantially curtailed the development of the
high-yield bond market in France (Cafritz and Tene, 2013). But court deliberation about
usury legislation seems to be an ever-present phenomenon. In Ancient Rome, for instance,
the existence of legislation on usury did not prevent judges from frequently adjusting interest
rate ceilings to what was customary in the community (Mackeldey, 1883, p. 306). Courts
continued to play a role in shaping interest rate ceilings well into modernity. For instance,
a study about the American experience in the 19th century concluded that courts tended
to maintain usury laws for handshake agreements while allowing more latitude to parties
writing contracts (Geisst, 2013, p. 149). All of the above justies the premise that courts
may disagree with interest rate legislation in nding it too lenient (so contracts that are in
the permitted zone are invalidated) or too strict (so contracts that are in the prohibited
zone are validated).
3 The model of contingent judicial deference
A case, characterized by a variable x, is contested in court. The variable x may be the
interest rate in a credit contract, the number of trials before a new drug was sold over the
counter, how much capital a business held before it went bust, the years of experience of
the captain of the sinking boat, the time between conception and termination of pregnancy,
13Straus v. Elless Co., 222 N. W. 752 (Mich. 1929); Alston v. American Mortgage Co., 116 Ohio St. 643, 157 N. E. 374
(1927); Byrd v. Link-Newcomb Mill and Lumber Co., 118 Miss. 179, 79 So. 100 (1918).
14See Marquette Natl Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 318 (1978).
15 In the United States, the term national bank designates a bank that is chartered and supervised by the O¢ ce of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). State banks, in contrast, are chartered and supervised by state government. Case law
has extended the privilege of exporting interest rates from more to less favorable states to federally-related lenders that are
state-chartered and to federal savings and loans institutions.
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etc.
There exists a maximum admissible value of x, denoted by x, but adjudicators are
imperfectly informed and dont know what the ceiling should be they do not know the
exact value of x. In the above examples, x may be an interest rate ceiling (to detect
unconscionability), the minimum number of trials for a drug (to detect fulllment of the
manufacturers duty of care), capital requirements for rms (to detect undercapitalization),
and so on.
Adjudicators have information from: (i) the specic legislation on the topic; and (ii) their
own priors, which comprise every relevant aspect of the law but the specic legislation. The
prior varies across adjudicators, since the interpretation of how general principles of law
apply to a specic case should be subject to signicant idiosyncratic di¤erences.
Adjudicator i is characterized by her prior beliefs about x, represented by a continuous
density function fi. For simplicity, we assume that x is distributed between xL and xH ,
with 0  xL < xH <1. In Appendix A we show a simple generalization of the model that
allows for an unbounded support and a positive mass at x =1.
We make two technical assumptions on this density function: fi is strictly quasi-concave,
which means that if x = 30% is more likely to be the ideal ceiling than x = 20%, then
x = 15% has to be even less likely; and the density of the median fi(xmedi ) is larger than
1= (xH   xL) (which would be the density in case of a uniform distribution), which means
that the median is not an unlikely draw. These assumptions are satised by single-peaked




Figure 3: Beliefs of adjudicator i about x
To help x ideas, in the example of interest rate ceilings, a pro-marketadjudicator who
believes that the ideal ceiling x would probably be high is characterized by a distribution
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fi that assumes low values for low x and high values for large x. In contrast, a skeptical-
about-marketsadjudicator is characterized by a distribution fi that assumes high values for
small ceilings x. A distribution fi with a high variance (and hence a low peak) characterizes
an adjudicator that feels poorly informed about the issue.
There is also legislation establishing a ceiling x, which we denote by X (it can be any
number between xL and xH). An adjudicator asks herself: was the legislation guided by
good and accurate information? Was it enacted by well-intentioned legislators? Have
circumstances changed enough to make that piece of information irrelevant?
In order to capture this idea in the simplest possible way, we assume there are two types
of legislators: the goodlegislator knows what x should be and chooses X = x; the bad
legislator is a clueless agent that chooses X = ~x, where ~x is a random drawn from a uniform
distribution between xL and xH .16 The prior probability that the legislator is goodis .
Using her prior and Bayes rule, adjudicator i calculates the probability that the legislator
is good given X.
In what follows, we assume that the adjudicator either follows the legislation or ignores it,
in which case she decides based on her prior only. The underlying idea is that adjudicators
are e¤ectively constrained by legislation: either they apply the legislation or they justify
why it should not be applied and base their decision on something else, which in the model is
represented by their prior beliefs. The decision thus depends on preferences about following
and ignoring a good and a bad piece of legislation. We can thus assume that adjudicator
i applies the legislation if her posterior probability that the legislator is good is at least
as large as , where  2 (0; ), and ignores the legislation otherwise. If the legislation is
ignored, the adjudicator chooses what is more likely to be the correct decision according to
her prior fi only.17
An adjudicator facing no institutional constraints would not restrict herself to a choice
between applying or ignoring the legislation. She would calculate the probability that each
decision is optimal and act accordingly. The underlying idea is that an adjudicator can
always nd a way to justify her decision. We persent a model along these lines in Appendix
B. Our main conclusions also hold is that setting.
16The random draw from a uniform distribution is a modeling simplication that allows us to capture the key idea that
ceilings in a certain range are more likely to reect a sensible view of the world, while ceilings outside this range are less likely
to be based on accurate knowledge about the issue. In the model in Appendix A, the implied distribution of x from the bad
legislatoris not uniform, which seems more realistic.
17The evaluation of the legislation thus resembles a hypothesis test: just like a person being trialed is presumed sane (but
can later be proved insane), the legislation is presumed good(but can be circumvented if unacceptable to courts). In practice,
courts pursue a number of strategies to circumvent the command enshrined in legislation. For example, in rejecting statutory
caps to punitive damages that are deemed too low, US state courts can level a constitutional challenge against the cap (as
modeled in Avraham and Bustos, 2010). Alternatively, the passing of a cap on punitive damages can prompt juries to grant
larger compensatory damage awards that disguise the embedded punitive element, as suggested in Robbennolt and Studebaker
(1999) and Sharkey (2008).
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3.1 The adjudicators decision
The legislation reveals information about the type of the legislator. A simple application
of the Bayes rule yields the posterior probability that the legislator is goodconditional on










+ 1   (1)
Owing to the quasi-concavity of fi, Pr
 
goodj X is also quasi-concave in [xL; xH ]. The
posterior probability Pr
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is small, adjudicator i has reasons to believe that the legislation
came from a badlegislator because a good legislator is unlikely to choose such X and
a bad legislator chooses randomly. Since Pr
 
goodj X is quasi-concave, the likelihood of
a good legislator will be su¢ ciently small if X is below some critical point XLi or if X is
larger than some critical point XHi. Dene XLi as
XLi = sup





xjPr  goodj X   for all X > x	








> 1. Hence, XLi < X0i < XHi.
The following proposition summarizes the adjudicators decision.
Proposition 1 Consider a maximum legislated x given by X 2 [xL; xH ].
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1. There is deference to legislation as long as X 2 [XLi; XHi], with xL  XLi < XHi 
xH .
2. Whenever X 62 [XLi; XHi], the adjudicator ignores the legislation follows a ceiling
Xi = X0i.
Proof. See the appendix.
The key implication of the model is that Xi , the threshold that e¤ectively determines







Figure 5: Adjudicator is e¤ective ceiling
As long as X 2 [XLi; XHi], Xi = X, so there is judicial deference. However, when X <
XLi, the likelihood of a goodlegislator is su¢ ciently small, hence the statute is ignored
and the adjudicators e¤ective ceiling becomesX0i, which is larger thatXLi. Likewise, when
X > XHi, the rule is discarded and the adjudicators e¤ective ceiling becomes X0i < XHi.
As mentioned before, a Bayesian adjudicator facing no institutional constraints would
calculate the probability that each decision is optimal and act accordingly. The model in
Appendix B considers this case and shows that an adjudicators e¤ective ceiling Xi would
also be non-monotonic in the legal cap X. The relationship between Xi and X would be
given by Figure 14 instead of Figure 5, but the qualitative implications in both cases are
basically the same.
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3.2 The odds a transaction is invalidated
We now consider a world with several adjudicators, and an agent does not know the ad-
judicators type when suing. A lawsuit against a transaction characterized by x (say, the
interest rate in a credit contract) is brought to court. We now compare the odds the lawsuit
will be successful under two di¤erent legislated caps, X1 and X2, with X1 < X2.
For x 2   X1; X2, the two legislated caps yield di¤erent prescriptions and that has a
direct e¤ect on adjudicatorsdecisions. Those who choose to follow the rules will allow the
transaction when the legislated cap is X2 > x but not when the cap is X1 < x. However,
when x 62   X1; X2, a larger legislated cap has the opposite e¤ect on adjudicatorsdecisions.
Proposition 2 summarizes the result.
Proposition 2 Consider legislated caps X1 and X2, with X1 < X2. Denote by p(xj X) the
probability that a contract characterized by x will be judged illegal given an interest rate cap
equal to X.
1. For x 62   X1; X2, p(xj X2)  p(xj X1).
2. For x < X1 < X2, p(xj X2) > p(xj X1) whenever there is an adjudicator i such that
X0i < x and X1  XHi < X2.
3. For X1 < X2 < x, p(xj X2) > p(xj X1) whenever there is an adjudicator i such that
X0i  x and X1  XLi < X2.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 6 shows an example of the probability that a contract characterized by x will
be judged illegal in case of a legislated cap equal to X1 (solid line), and in case of a more




, the prescription from both caps is
the same. However, the likelihood that each rule be followed is (potentially) di¤erent. The
rst statement of Proposition 2 shows that as long as the transaction is not directly a¤ected
by the change in the legislation  i.e., for contracts with x 62   X1; X2 the probability
that the contract will be invalidated is at least as large for more lenient laws. The second
and third statement of the proposition show what is needed for the probability p(xj X) to
(strictly) increase in X.
The intuition for the second statement of Proposition 2 is as follows: without any rule,
adjudicator i would deem excessive any contract with x > X0i, which is smaller than
both legislated caps. A (relatively) strict law setting a cap equal to X1 is in the realm
of reasonable rules for adjudicator i, since X1 < XHi. Hence, adjudicator i would follow
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Figure 6: Probability the contract is invalidated under the more lenient rule (dashed line) and under the
stricter rule (solid line)
this rule and allow transactions as long as x < X1. In constrast, a legislated cap equal
to X2 is deemed excessively lenient by adjudicator i, since X2 > XHi. This rule is thus
rejected, so adjudicator i follows her own judgment and deem illegal contracts with x > X0i.
Although the legislated ceiling prescribed by the more lenient rule, X2, is larger than X1,
the adjudicator e¤ectively considers an interest rate ceiling that is smaller than X1 (since
X0i < X1).
The intuition for the third statement of Proposition 2 is basically the same. A (relatively)
lenient law setting a ceiling equal to X2 is in the realm of reasonable rules for adjudicator
i, since X2 > XLi. Hence, adjudicator i would follow this rule and disallow contracts
with x > X2. In constrast, a legislated cap equal to X1 is deemed excessively strict by
adjudicator i, since X1 < XLi. This rule is thus rejected, so adjudicator i follows her own
judgment and decides according to a ceiling Xi = X0i. Although the cap prescribed by the
stricter rule is smaller than X2, the adjudicator e¤ectively considers a ceiling that is larger
than X2 (since X0i > X2).18
4 Application: usury laws
We now apply our model of contingent judicial deference to an economy with a simple credit
market. We assume there are no market failures and no reason for interest rate caps. We
choose this modeling strategy for simplicity and to ensure that all e¤ects of usury laws on
18Note that this model generates the empirical pattern described in Salama (2017) as mentioned in Section 2. Adjudicator
i will declare a credit contract is not valid if the likelihood of a good legislator is su¢ ciently small and the contracted interest
rate x is larger than X0i. As long as the rst condition holds for some adjudicators, the odds a contract will be deemed invalid
owing to excessively high interest rates will be increasing in x, since the mass of adjudicators with X0i < x is increasing in x.
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this economy are on the maximum allowed interest rate and on the probability a lawsuit
against high interest rates are accepted. The set of possible economic reasons for capping
interest rates includes: some form of irrationality or time inconsistency in preferences that
leads agents to borrow at excessively high interest rates; some negative externality from
risky loans; banksmarket power; among others. A model with some of these (or other)
reasons for capping interest rates with the same demand and supply curves for loans would
yield the same positive implications as this model. The normative implications could be
di¤erent, but these are not the focus of this paper.
There is a measure-one continuum of agents, indexed by j, each one with an investment
project. In order to invest, an agent needs to borrow 1 unit of resources, the cost of a
project. The probability that project j will succeed is j, which is specic to the agent
and lies in the interval (0; 1). A successful project yields B (a constant larger than 1) with
probability j and 0 otherwise. There is limited liability, so the debt is wiped away when
the project yields 0 and B is the maximum amount a bank can collect.
There is a competitive banking sector. Banks lend to agent j at rate Rj = 1+ rj, which
is endogenous (and they may decide not to lend). All information is common knowledge
(j is known to everyone). The opportunity cost of resources is normalized to 0. Banks
and agents are risk neutral.
4.1 Benchmark case: no litigation
Suppose there are no court cases. The only risk faced by the bank is that agents might go
bankrupt.
Let Rj be the interest rate in a loan to agent j. The zero prot condition for a bank
implies:




Loans occur in this model as long as
jB  1 (3)
Figure 7 shows interest rates in this economy as a function of the probability of success
j, for a given B.
A binding cap on interest rates would reduce the amount of loans in this economy.
Disallowing interest rates larger than R < B would imply that projects with j 2 [1=B; 1= R)








Figure 7: Interest rates as function of  (no court cases)
4.2 The law and the economy
We now include the possibility of lawsuits in the model. If her project succeeds, the borrower
can go to court and try to avoid paying interest on her debt, which entails a cost c (we will
think of it as an e¤ort cost). When this happens, an adjudicator is randomly assigned to
the case and the probability the agent does not need to pay interest on her loan is given as
in Section 3.2. The model implies that the probability interest rates will be declared illegal
is weakly increasing and possibly discontinuous in R.
For an agent that did not go bankrupt, it is worth going to court if the expected gain
(interest not paid Rj   1 times probability p (Rj)) is larger than c:
p (Rj) [Rj   1] > c =) Rj > c
p (Rj)
+ 1









In case Rj  R^, agent j will never choose to go to court. Hence a deal will occur
whenever B is larger than 1=j as in the benchmark case.
In case Rj > R^, agent j will sue if she does not go bankrupt. Hence, the expected payo¤
for the bank is
j ([1  p (Rj)]Rj + p (Rj))  1
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1  p (Rj) (5)
hence Rj is increasing in p(Rj) as long as j 2 (0; 1). In words, the bank charges higher
interest rates if the borrower has higher chances of prevailing in court (but the amount the
bank can collect is limited to B).
If the agent goes bankrupt, her payo¤ is 0. If her project is successful, she is expected
to repay p (Rj) + (1   p (Rj))Rj (with probability p, no interest is paid; with probability
1   p, Rj is repaid) and the cost c. The agent is willing to borrow if her expected payo¤,
conditional on the success of the project, is positive. Hence, a deal occurs if:19
B   p (Rj)  (1  p (Rj))Rj   c  0
Plugging in the interest rate from (5), we get that a loan takes place as long as
j (B   c)  1
which is a more stringent condition than the one in (3). Figure 8 illustrates the relationship






Figure 8: Interest rates as function of  (when lawsuits occur)
In the region where lawsuits occur, the minimum expected disbursement with interest
rates is still 1=j, as the probability that interest rates are deemed excessive by the adjudi-
cator is priced in, but agents also pay the cost c. The largest interest rate in this economy
19Naturally, the probability interest rates are void is priced in loan contracts. Hence the legal risk considered ex ante by
lenders will be consistent with the ex post probability that interest is not paid whatever the legal risk is.
20Parameters in the gure are such that in equilibrium, some borrowers sue the bank.
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is implicitly given by
Rmax =
B   c  p(Rmax)
1  p(Rmax) (6)
but the marginal agent is e¤ectively paying B   c in interest (in expected terms), in case
her project succeeds. In the region where there is no litigation, ling a lawsuit does not
pay o¤ owing to the cost c. The discontinuity shows that banks lend at rates that are high
enough to compensate for the losses in court, so in equilibrium some potential borrowers
will be priced out of the market.
In comparison to the benchmark case in Section 4.1, the economy is a¤ected in two ways:
(i) there are less credit operations; and (ii) there are more costly lawsuits.
4.3 Usury laws
We now study the e¤ects of a legislated interest rate cap R in this credit market. First,
consider an economy with no interest rate caps, i.e., R = 1. Using (4) and (6), the
condition for no lawsuits in equilibrium is that
p(Bj R =1)  c
B   1 (7)
In words, if the probability that gross interest rate B will be deemed too high in an economy
with no interest rate caps ( R =1) times the gain from not paying interest (B   1) is not
enough to cover the suing costs c, we are back to the case of Section 4.1. In case there are
no lawsuits in equilibrium, usury laws can only reduce the amount of credit in the economy.
Now, assume there are lawsuits in equilibrium in this economy, so condition 7 does not
hold. Proposition 3 shows conditions for the existence of interest rate caps that increase
the amount of loans in the economy.
Proposition 3 Consider an economy with no interest rate caps where the condition in (7)
does not hold, so there are lawsuits in equilibrium.
1. The maximum gross interest rate in this economy Rmax is larger than B.
2. There is an interest rate cap R 2 (B   c; B] that raises the amount of loans in this
economy as long as
p(B   cj R = B   c) < c
B   c  1 (8)
3. An interest rate cap R = B implements the equilibrium with loans to all projects that
satisfy (3) and no lawsuits as long as
p(Bj R = B)  c
B   1 (9)
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Proof. See the appendix.
The rst statement of the proposition just shows that in the presence of lawsuits, al-
though the marginal project nanced in equilibrium is safer than the marginal project
nanced when no lawsuits occur, interest rates are larger. The high interest rates compen-
sate the legal risk interest rates might not be paid.
The second statement of the proposition shows that a properly chosen interest rate cap
raises the amount of loans in this economy as long as the condition in (8) holds. There are
two reasons for why the condition in (8) is milder than the condition in (7). The rst is that
(8) considers the probability an adjudicator will deem too lenient an interest rate cap of
B  c, while (7) considers the probability a judge will deem too lenient a rule that imposes
no restriction on interest rates. The latter probability might be substantially higher. The
second reason is that (8) refers to the probability of a succesful claim against interest rates
B  c, while (7) refers to the probability of a successful claim against interest rates B. This
reects the idea that riskier projects can be nanced at lower interest rates in the absence
of legal risk (the risk that courts will declare interest rates are excessively high).
The third statement of Proposition 3 shows if (9) holds, a cap on interest rates at R = B
implements the equilibrium described in Section 4.1, where all projects with an expected
positive return are nanced. The condition in (9) is milder than that in (7) because an
adjudicator might consider excessively lenient a rule that imposes no restriction on interest
rates but might accept a rule that sets an interest rate cap of B.
In standard economic models, usury laws reduce the amount of loans in the economy,
as agents that would only be able to get credit at very high interest rates cannot get loans.
This e¤ect is also present in this model. However, here, well chosen interest rate caps also
a¤ect adjudicatorsdecisions, reducing the probability of successful lawsuits. This leads to
lower interest rates and might lead to more borrowing in equilibrium.
5 Examples
We used usury laws to demonstrate the proposition that legislation specifying that some-
thing cannot be done raises the probability that judges will allow related things not expressly
forbidden.21 We now wish to show that this proposition applies beyond credit transactions.
We use life insurance as an example.22 Older life insurance policies in the United States
habitually contained a suicide exclusionwhereby coverage would be denied to the bene-
21As well as on the analytically equivalent proposition that the enactment of legislation permitting something may raise
the probability that judges will prohibit related things not expressly permitted.
22Most of the factual background on the history of life insurance discussed in this section can be found in Schuman (1993).
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ciaries of a deceased person who voluntarily took her life.23 The main concerns of insurance
companies were, quite clearly, adverse selection and moral hazard. Yet judges and juries
were often uncomfortable with upholding the suicide exclusion, normally for a concern
with protecting an innocent beneciary from ruin (a non-working wife with children, for
example).24
To invalidate the suicide exclusion, courts basically employed the following reasoning:
suicide is the intentional act of a person enjoying all her mental faculties, but those who
commit suicide are in principle insane, so insurance companies can only deny recovery if they
can prove that the persons who took out their lives were sane in doing so.25 But fullling
this burden of proof was evidently di¢ cult, not least because the person whose sanity was
in question was already dead, so courts could then recharacterize suicides as accidents and
maintain the right to recovery under the insurance policy.26 Insurance companies tried to
deal with this problem by drafting the suicide exclusion so as to encompass suicide, sane
or insane, but that broader wording was often to no avail and the exclusion would still be
considered inapplicable.27
In response, most state legislators in the United States passed legislation prohibiting
the exclusion when the suicidal took her life two years or more after the policy was issued.
This rule is now inscribed in the books of most American states (Tseng, 2004).28 As a
result, US courts have now basically dropped the argument that a suicide is in principle
insane (at least insofar as the two-year gap is concerned) and insurance policies are now
drafted accordingly.29 This is exactly a situation where a legislation imposing a prohibition
(suicide exclusions are not valid after two years) raised the prospects that judges allow
related things not expressly forbidden by legislation (the suicide exclusion being held valid
within the two-year period after the policy was issued).
Our model also sheds light on some historical events specically in the realm of interest
rate caps. The debates over interest rate regulation in the United Kingdom in 19th and
23See Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Peters, 42 Md. 414, at 417 (1875).
24Columbian Natl Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 193 Ky. 395, at 397 (1922). But see Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Insurance Co., 3
Otto 284, at 286-287 (1876) (accepting contractual limitation of liability).
25See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 226 Ky. 597, 11 S. W. 2d 417 (1928); Ladwig v. National Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
247 N.W. 312 (Wis. 1933); and Muzenich v. Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union, 154 Kan. 537, 119 P 2d 504 (1941).
But see Strasberg v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. U.S., 281 App. Div. 9, at 13-14 (1952); Dent v. Virginia Mut. Benet Life
Ins. Co., 226 A. 2d 166, at 167 (D.C. App. Ct. 1967) (holding a presumption of sanity and ascribing to the plainti¤s the
burden of proving insanity of the deceased).
26Mutual Life Insurance Co v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, at 591 (1872); Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Peters, 42 Md. 414, at
421 (1875); and Ladwig v. National Guardian Life Ins. Co., 247 N.W. 312, at 314 (Wis. 1933).
27See Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Bailey, 284 S.W. 403, at 404 (1926); and Christensen v. New England Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 197 Ga. 807, at 809-812 (1944).
28 In a few states the legislated exception covers only one year and in a few others there is no such legislation.
29See McKinnon v. Lincoln Benet Life Company, 162 Fed. Appx. 223, at 227 (2006); Mitchell v. American General
Life Insurance Company, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93742, at 5-6, 8 (2014); and Collins v. Unum Life Insurance Company of
America, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60628, at 31, 34, 37 (2016).
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early 20th century are a case in point. In the context of the ascendance of nance in the
19thCentury, in 1854 the British Parliament had passed the Usury Laws Act abolishing
all interest rate ceiling in the United Kingdom (Geisst, 2013, pp. 131-133). Yet moved by
alleged abuses against debtors, in 1897 the House of Commons appointed a committee to
investigate moneylending (Goode, 1982). The report was nalized in 1898 and contained
several anecdotal evidences used to substantiate the conclusion that moneylenders were
abusing their permission to price credit on market conditions (Goode, 1982, p. 44).30 In
response, parliament enacted the Money-Lenders Act of 1900, which expressly authorized
courts to reopen credit transactions when interest or other charges were considered excessive
or the terms of the transaction were deemed harsh, unconscionable or inequitable. The Act
of 1900 also required moneylenders to be registered with (but not licensed by) the Customs
and Excise (Goode, 1982).31
The Money-Lenders Act of 1900 was largely ine¤ectual, rst because registration was
not followed by any kind of supervision and second because statutory authorization for
courts to reopen loan transactions was unnecessary, as history books are full of references
to discussions over the legality of interest rates before the enactment of the Act of 1900
(Geisst, 2013, p. 177, noting that interest rates became usurious beyond some exible
point even in the absence of a statutory cap). After a brief amendment in 1911, the Money-
lenders Act of 1900 was more substantively amended by Money-Lenders Act of 1927. This
is where the model advanced in the present article can be useful to reassess history.
The conventional wisdom is that the Moneylenders Acts of 1900 and 1927 are part of
a single regulatory wave of anti-usury, pro-debtor policymaking in the United Kingdom
(Goode, 1982; Crowther Report, 1972; Geisst, 2013, p. 177). Yet only the Act of 1927
did contain an explicit interest rate threshold, which the Act of 1900 did not, which means
that the e¤ects, and perhaps even its motivation, of the 1927 Act may have been di¤erent
from those of the Act of 1900. The 1927 Act is said to have strengthened the anti-usury
objectives of the previous Act of 1900 by requiring licensing (instead of only registration)
and by imposing requirements and restrictions as to the seeking of business, formalities of
contract and enforcement by moneylenders. Moreover, and crucially for present purposes,
the Moneylenders Act of 1927 introduced a presumption that interest rates over 48% were
prima facie unconscionable. Although this was not a full-edged interest rate prohibition,
it meant that whenever interest rates were above 48% per year the moneylender had the
burden of proving that the loan was neither harsh nor unconscionable.
30The report famously included a testimony from a moneylender admitting to have charged 3,000% interest, and of another
one that provided credit under 34 di¤erent aliases to avoid the notoriety of being an abusive lender (Goode, 1982).
31The Money-Lenders Act did not a¤ect clearing banks but only other nanciers.
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Our model permits to hypothesize that the inclusion of this 48% threshold in the Money-
Lenders Act of 1927 may have in fact served, willfully or not, to enlarge credit markets and
consolidate market pricing of credit in Britain. The main reason is that before 1927 courts
did reopenedcontracts and sometimes upheld standards of fairness in interest rate charges
below 48% (Meston, 1968), so it is not unreasonable to imagine that this quasi-interest
rate ceiling in fact swayed courts into accepting higher interest rates in money lending
transactions. To be true, after 1927 courts did not simply invalidate every contract with
interest rates above 48%; there were cases where courts upheld contracts with interest rates
as high as 177% (Meston, 1968), so the 48% threshold was indeed read as a presumption
and not as a prohibition. But historians recognize that market rates did prevail in money-
lending transactions even after 1927, and that the Money-Lenders Act did little to reduce
prevailing interest rates (Geisst, 2013, p. 178), which does not demonstrate but is consistent
with our model of legislated prohibitions that permit.
A similar analysis can be replicated with present-day cases where usury ceilings are rst
eliminated and subsequently reinstated. For instance, the wave of consumer protection
as of the 1960s decade has led several countries in Europe to reinstate usury ceilings for
certain kinds of transactions. Examples include overdraft credit and protected housing
loans in Spain, credit unions in Ireland, and non-banks in Greece, but there are others. The
exact implications of such legislation are unclear, but the conventional wisdom that they in
practice served to curb lending has never been demonstrated (Reifner and Schröder, 2012).
One of the reasons may be that researchers have consistently failed to take into account
the interplay between courts and legislation.
A nal point is that the courtsjudgment calls and statutory interpretations can also
change over time, and usury provides again a telling example. Many states in the United
States have strict usury laws in their books, but based on a Supreme Court decision of
1978 courts now permit nationally chartered banks to apply the lawful interest rate of the
lenders home state independently of the usury laws where the borrower is domiciled. Yet
a 2016 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part this
longstanding position. It held that if a debt is assigned by a national bank to an entity
that is not a national bank, then borrowers can raise state usury laws in their favor.32 This
highly publicized decision created much legal uncertainty for lenders and other nancial
industry rms whose businesses rely on securitizations and bundling of debt. The decision
is valid only in the states of the Second Circuit New York, Connecticut and Vermont 
and a pressing question concerns whether other states will follow suit. This court debates
32See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F. 3d 246 (2015). The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
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illustrate the problem of dispersion in court decisions, to which we now turn.
6 Rules and legal uncertainty
We now use our model of contingent judicial deference to study the interaction between
a legislated ceiling X and the dispersion of judicial decisions, which is a measure of legal
uncertainty. The model in Section 3 implies that adjudicator i defers to legislation and
follows the legislated cap x as long as X 2 (XLi; XHi) and decides according to a cap
Xi = X0i if X 62 (XLi; XHi). We now parameterize these three thresholds so that, for
adjudicator i,
XLid = xL0 + "i + d
XHid = xH0 + "i + d
X0id = x00 + "i + d
where xL0, xH0 and x00 are the thresholds that characterize the decision of the median ad-
judicatorat an initial point in time (d = 0), "i is an adjudicators specic term, distributed
with full support between  " and ",  > 0 is a positive constant and d 2 R is a preference
shifter, common to all adjudicators. We assume that xL0   " > 0, so that all adjudicators
agree that su¢ ciently low values of x should be allowed.
This specication has two important features. First, there is dispersion among adjudi-
catorsjudgements, given by the term "i, that does not vary in time. Second, there is a
preference shifter that does not a¤ect the variance of adjudicators opinions, only its mean.
One interpretation is that as time goes by, judgments change, and this is captured in the
model by the variable d. The question then is how the legislation a¤ects decisions for
di¤erent values of d.
A statute imposes a ceiling on x denoted by X. For d = 0, all adjudicators follow the
rule as long as x 2 [xL0 + "; xH0   "]. This condition is satised by the top line in the
example in Figure 9, that shows the bounds for XLi0 and XHi0. For any adjudicator i,
X 2 (XLi0; XHi0).
For a given d, an adjudicators decision can be summarized by her e¤ective threshold for
x, denoted by Xid, which is the maximum value of x that adjudicator i deems acceptable
given d ( Xid may be di¤erent from X).
Naturally, for larger d, some adjudicators start to reject the rule and follow their own
judgment. This generates dispersion in Xid. The interesting implication of this model is




Figure 9: Changing judgments and a xed rule
Proposition 4 Assume X 2 [xL0 + "; xH0   "]. It follows that:
1. For d = 0, the variance of Xid is 0, since X

id =
X for all i.
2. For su¢ ciently large d, the variance of Xid equals the variance of "i, since all adjudi-
cators choose to ignore the rule.
3. For some intermediary value of d, the variance of Xid is larger than the variance of
"i, implying that the rule induces dispersion.
Proof. See the appendix.
The rst statement follows from the assumption that X 2 [xL0 + "; xH0   "]. The second
statement is a direct implication of the assumptions that xL0 " > 0, since for large enough
d, XLid will be larger than X for all i, so all adjudicators will follow their own judgment,
Xid = x00 + "i + d for all i. Hence, the dispersion in X

id will be equal to the dispersion in
"i (since x00 and d are the same for all i).
The interesting result is the third statement of Proposition 4. For some intermediary
values of d, the existence of a rule actually makes adjudicatorsdecisions more disperse.
Figure 10 shows dispersion of Xid as a function of d.
The bottom line of Figure 9 helps to explain the intuition for this increase in dispersion.
In this case, the lowest value of XLid, xL0 "+d, is just a little bit smaller than X. Hence
XLid > X for the majority of adjudicators. For them, Xid = x0id. However, for the few
agents with XLid < X, the rule is deemed reasonable, so Xid = X. Since their XLid is
very close to X, their e¤ective threshold Xid is smaller than x0id. Since the agents with the
lowest x0id are the ones whose decisions follow an even lower e¤ective threshold, X, we get
that the dispersion in e¤ective thresholds is higher than in the case t is very large.
In words, in the situation depicted in the bottom line of Figure 9, most adjudicators











Figure 10: Legal uncertainty as a function of d
the lowest thresholds for x in the absence of a rule still nd the rule reasonable, though
more strict than what they would choose in the absence of a rule. Hence the legislation is
inducing those with a preference for a lower Xid to choose an even lower threshold without
a¤ecting those who prefer a larger Xid.
When XLid > X for some but not all adjudicators, so that some apply the legislation
and others dont, two e¤ects are in place: (i) the rule induces conformity within those who
follow the rule; (ii) the rule might increase the gap between those who follow the rule and
those who choose to ignore it. When XLid > X for very few adjudicators, the former e¤ect
dominates. However, when XLid > X for the vast majority adjudicators, the second e¤ect
dominates, so the variance of Xid is certainly larger than the variance of "i. Intuitively,
inducing conformity within those who follow the rule has a negligible e¤ect on the dispersion
of Xid if too few agents follow the rule.
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7 Final remarks
Legislation that seems to have been enacted by well-informed and well-intentioned legisla-
tors is more likely to be followed by courts. Building on this simple premise, we proposed
a model of judicial deference and derived implications about the e¤ect of legislation on the
probability of statutory enforcement and on the dispersion of judicial decisions within a
legal system. The key result of the model is the non-monotonic relation between legislated
bounds and bounds e¤ectively imposed by courts.
This non-monotonicity resonates with the empirical ndings in Bindler and Hjalmarsson
(2016). They study the e¤ects of changes in criminal legislation in the United Kingdom
33 In an intermediary region, any e¤ect can dominate. Hence, the variance of xit may be larger than the variance of "i for
a large set of values of t.
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(and in particular the abolition of capital punishment in the 1800s) on the behavior of juries.
Their main result is that reductions in punishment severity lead to increases in the chances
of conviction. Hence the expected punishment might be non-monotonic in the legislated
punishment. Similarly, experimental research has shown that the enactment of caps on the
amount that juries can establish as damages increases the awards in low-value cases that
would otherwise generate smaller awards (Hinsz and Indahl, 1995; and Robbennolt and
Studebaker, 1999).34
The model raises additional theoretical and applied questions. One theoretical question
concerns the dynamics of courts and legislatures concerning prohibitions. We showed that
once courts are considered, the enactment of a prohibition to contract can create a permis-
sion to contract. However, our model is static, while the examples discussed suggest that
there may be a dynamic component in the interplay of courts and legislatures.
As to the applied aspects, one crucial question concerns feasibility. This article should
not be read as an endorsement of usury laws, but as a study of their economic e¤ects once
court discretion is factored into credit models. The exercise of judgment calls by courts
can cause the enactment of usury laws to enlarge credit markets as long as market interest
rates are routinely viewed by courts as excessive. This does not mean that the model
is valid only for high interest rates jurisdictions. Japan, for instance, is worldwide famous
for its low interest rates, yet usury ceilings have become highly contentious in its consumer
markets (Ramseyer, 2013). Conversely, some countries with much higher interest rate levels
seem to have reduced the problem of interest rate litigation by adopting exible and higher
interest rate ceilings. For instance, in Slovenia caps range from as high as 453% per year
for small loans to 13.2% for long-term loans (data of 2010; see Reifner and Schröder, 2012,
p. v). The message then is that circumstances matter.
Second, the success of usury laws depends crucially on legislative precision, which is
di¢ cult to attain due to the well-known problems of politicians motivation and costly infor-
mation. In particular, dispersion in court decision-making can be particularly problematic
where courts apply di¤erent treatment to di¤erent kinds of borrowers and transactions,
because in that case a at interest rate ceiling may curtail the lendersability to charge
risk-adjusted rates. An alternative to deal with this problem is to create various classes of
interest rate ceilings, as is now common practice in various countries, but legislated error
tends to grow with statutory complexity.
34 In the literature on damages, the non-monotonic relation between the legislated ceilings and the awards e¤ectively imposed
is attributed to anchoring, the cognitive bias of relying too much on the piece of information that is o¤ered rst (such as a
statutory damage cap). However, unlike the model of legal uncertainty developed in section 6, anchoring can hardly explain
by itself the result found by Robbennolt and Studebaker (1999) that the passing of a legislated cap on punitive damages can
also increase the variance of court decisions.
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Beyond the problem of usury ceilings, analytically similar concerns can be expected to
exist with any kind of legislated prohibitions. We expect that therein lies the main value
of this article.
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A The model with an unbounded support for the ceiling
In the model of Section 3, the interest rate ceiling has to be a number between xL and xH with
xH <1. This isincompatible with the fact that in some countries, there is no ceiling for interest
rates in credit contracts. Here we show a simple modication of the model that would allow for
beliefs with a positive mass on the ideal ceiling being innite (and on the ideal ceiling being zero
as well).
There is a one-dimensional variable  that summarizes what needs to be known about the issue.
This variable  can assume values between 0 and 1. In case of interest rate ceilings,  would be a
function of several economic and (possibly) moral factors, including the market power of banks,
borrowerspropensity to take unconscionable loans, moral judgements about individualsright to
sign private contracts or about limits to interest rates, etc.
Adjudicators do not know the value of . Adjudicator i is characterized by her beliefs about
, which depends on her information and, possibly, on her moral judgements. Her beliefs about 
are represented by a continuous density function fi. We assume fi is strictly quasi-concave and
the density of the median fi(medi ) is larger than 1 as in the model of Section 3.
38
Denote by x the maximum admissible value of x (an interest rate ceiling for example). We






for   L
for  2 (L; H)
for   H
(10)
where 0  L < H  1, 0 > 0, lim!L () = 0 and lim!H () =1. .
As in Section 3, there are two types of legislators. Here, the good legislator knows  and
chooses X given by (10); the bad legislator is a clueless agent that draws a random y from a
uniform distribution between 0 and 1 and chooses X as if  were equal to y. All other assumptions
are as in the model of Section 3.
In this model, a version of Proposition 1 also holds (the proof is available upon request).
Adjudicator i will defer to the legislation whenever X 2 [XLi; XHi] with 0  XLi < XHi  1
and will otherwise ignore the legislation and follow a ceiling Xi = X0i. Propositions 2, 3 and 4
then follow from this result.
B A model of unconstrained adjudicators
We now modify the model from Section 3 in the following way: now, instead of defer to the legis-
lation as long as Pr
 
goodj X > , the adjudicator calculates the probability that the transaction
should be allowed, considering her own prior information and what she can learn from the legis-
lation, and decides depending on whether the probability that the transaction should be allowed
is larger than 0:5.35 This is thus a model of a Bayesian adjudicator facing no institutional con-
straints. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that the median of the distribution fi coincides
with the mode, i.e., the value of x that maximizes fi (x) is xmedi .
All other assumptions of the original model are maintained. In particular, the legislator who
enacted the statute can be either goodor badand the legislation provides information about
it. Hence as before, upon observing a legislated ceiling equal to X, Pr
 
goodj X is given by
(1). Owing to the assumption that xmedi is also the mode of the distribution of fi, Pr
 
goodj X is
maximized at X = X0i. Owing to the quasiconcavity of fi, we have that Pr
 









for X > X0i.
Denote by Ji(x) the probability that a contract characterized by variable x should be allowed,
from the point of view of adjudicator i, based only on her prior knowledge fi. The function Ji is
given by:
Ji (x) = 1  F (x) (11)
Hence Ji is decreasing in x and Ji (X0i) = 0:5.
35The probability threshold of 0.5 is without lost of generality.
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Denote the legislation establishing a ceiling X by ` so `(x) = 1 for x  X and `(x) = 0
otherwise. Since an adjudicator aims at making the correct decision, she deems a contract valid
as long as the posterior probability that x should be allowed, given X, is larger than 0:5, i.e., if
Pr(xj X) = Pr  goodj X `(x) +  1  Pr  goodj X J(x)  0:5 (12)
For example, if `(x) = 1, the posterior probability that x should be allowed, Pr(xj X), is given by
the probability that the legislator is informed (rst term in the RHS of (12)) plus the probability
that the legislator is uninformed but x should indeed be allowed (second term of (12)). Thus the
adjudicator is e¤ectively weighing the legislation and her own judgment. The key implication of
(12) is that the weight on the legislation decreases as X gets farther away from X0i. In other
words, the weights attributed to each factor depend on how the legislation ts the adjudicators
judgment.
B.1 The adjudicators decision
We now show that, as in our baseline model, X has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the threshold
e¤ectively followed by the adjudicator, denoted by Xi .
Consider an adjudicator represented by Ji. In the case depicted in Figure 11, the prescription of
the legislation is identical to what she would decide in the absence of any rule. Hence Pr
 
goodj X











Figure 11: Legislation and judgement coincide
Pr(xj X) is a weighted average between ` and Ji, hence it is larger than 0.5 for x < X and
smaller than 0.5 for x > X.
Now, consider a larger threshold, as depicted in Figure 12. This cap allows for larger values
of x than the adjudicator would choose, in the absence of any legislation. Here, Pr(goodj X) is
smaller than in the previous case. Nevertheless, in this example, Pr(xj X) is still larger than 0:5
for x < X and negative for x > X. The adjudicator defers to the legislation.
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An increase in X by dx would have two e¤ects: (i) it would bring X further away from X0i
and thus reduce Pr(goodj X) by an innitesimal amount; (ii) Pr( X + dxj X + dx) would be the
average between J( X + dx) and 1 (and not 0 as before). Since Pr(xj X) > 0:5, as the change in











Figure 12: x > x0i; the adjudicator follows the letter of the law
However, if Pr(xj X) < 0:5, an increase in X by dx would actually reduce Xi . This case is
depicted in Figure 13. This legislation is more lenient than in Figure 12, so Pr(goodj X) is smaller
than in the previous case. In this example, Pr(xj X) < 0:5 for some x < X, so the adjudicator
does not follow the letter of the law.
An increase in X by dx would reduce Pr(goodj X) and would have no e¤ect on ` in a neigh-
borhood of Xi (since `(x) = 1 for x in this neighborhood). Hence, this increase in X by dx would
decrease Pr(xj X) for x < X. This implies that Pr(xj X) would cross the line x = 0:5 at a smaller












Figure 13: x > x0i; the adjudicator does not follow the letter of the law
The following proposition summarizes an adjudicators decision.
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Proposition 5 Consider a cap X 2 [xL; xH ] so that `(x) = 1 for x  X and `(x) =  1 otherwise.
1. The adjudicator deems x acceptable if and only if x  Xi for some Xi 2 [xL; xH ].
2. The adjudicator applies the letter of the law for X 2  XL; XH, with xL  XL < X0i <
XH  xH and does not apply the letter of the law for X outside this interval.










Proof. See the appendix.
The second point of Proposition 5 states that the adjudicator follows the letter of the law if the
legislation is close enough to her own judgment but might not follow it the disagreement between
` and Ji is large enough. The third and fourth points of the proposition state that outside the
region where the adjudicator follows the letter of the law, the adjudicators e¤ective interest rate




, a usury law with a lower interest rate
ceiling actually leads to a higher e¤ective interest rate ceiling Xi .
Figure 5 illustrates how a adjudicators e¤ective threshold Xi behaves as a function of the




Figure 14: An adjudicators e¤ective interest rate ceiling
Intuitively, if X is just a bit larger than X0i, the adjudicator defers to the legislation, since the
weight she attributes to the legislation is large enough to o¤set her mild disagreements with the
statute. As X goes up, the adjudicator gives less and less weight to the law. Once we reach the
region of no deference to the legislation, the adjudicators own interest rate ceiling Xi becomes





for a smaller X is the same.
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C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First statement: Recall XLi = sup






> 1= (xH   xL) by assumption; using (1) and X0i = xmedi , we get Pr (goodjX0i) >
, and since  > , Pr (goodjX0i) > .
Owing to the strict quasi-concavity of Pr
 
goodj X, if limx!XLi Pr (goodjx)  , then Pr (goodjx) <
 for x 2 [xL; XLi). The strict quasi-concavity of Pr
 
goodj X also implies that Pr (goodjx) > 
for x 2 (XLi; X0i). Hence the likelihood of a good legislator is smaller than  when x  XLi, but
is not rejected if x 2 [XLi; X0i].
A similar argument shows that the likelihood of a good legislator is smaller than  when
x  XHi, but not if x 2 [X0i; XHi].
Second statement: If X 62 [XLi; XHi], the adjudicator chooses what is more likely to be the
correct decision according to her prior fi only. The probability that a contract characterized by
variable x should be allowed is then given by the function Ji in 11, so Ji(x) is larger than half if
and only if x < X0i.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using Proposition 1, for x < X1 < X2, the contract will only be judged illegal by adjudicator
i if (i) the legislation is rejected and (ii) x > X0i. If the legislation is rejected because the cap
X is below XLi, the contract will nevertheless be deemed legal because x < X < XLi < X0i. If
the legislation is rejected because the cap exceeds XHi, then the contract will be deemed illegal
if x > X0i. The probability p(xj X) is thus equal to the mass of adjudicators with x > X0i and
X > XHi. This mass is weakly increasing in X, hence if X1 < X2, p(xj X2)  p(xj X1). This
inequality will be strict if there is some adjudicator i such that x > X0i and X2 > XHi but
X1  XHi. This yields the rst statement for x < X1 < X2 and the second statement.
A similar argument yields the rst statemente for X1 < X2 < x and the third statement.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
First statement: the condition in (4) implies that when lawsuits occur, the maximum interest rate
Rmax is such that
Rmax > 1 +
c
p (Rmax)
Using (6), this implies that
p(Rmax) >
c
B   1 (13)
but using (6), the condition Rmax > B can also be written as (13).
Second statement: in case interest rates are capped at B  c and (8) holds, when interest rates
are equal to B  C, the condition for no lawsuits in equilibrium in (4) does not hold and is slack.
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By continuity, there is some  > 0 such that a cap in interest rates equal to B   c +  yields no
lawsuits in equilibrium when interest rates are B   c +  (and thus no lawsuits for interest rates
not larger than B   c + ). That means that project j is nanced as long as j  1=(B   c + ).
In the absence of a usury law, lawsuits occur in equilibrium and project j is nanced only if
j  1=(B   c). Since 1=(B   c+ ) < 1=(B   c), capping interest rates at B   c+  increases the
volume of credit in the economy.
Third statement: in case interest rates are capped at B and (9) holds, the condition for no
lawsuits in equilibrium in (4) does not hold for any R  B. This implements the equilibrium
described in Section 4.1.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The rst statement follows from the assumption.
Second statement : for d >
 
X   xL0 + "

=, XLid > X for all i, hence all adjudicators reject





Third statement : Consider the case where d =
 
X   xL0 + "

=   , for some small  > 0, so
that  < (x00 xL0)=. For those with "i <  "+, it must be that X < XLid, so they reject the
rule and decide according to Xid = X0id. For those with "i   "+ , it must be that x  XLid,
so Xid = x. Since  < (x00   xL0), X < x0id. Hence the distribution of Xid is the distribution
of X0id with the lowest values of X0id replaced by x, which is smaller than the smallest X0id.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 5
First statement: S ince ` and Ji are both weakly decreasing in x and Pr(goodj X) is independent
of x, Pr
 
xj X is weakly decreasing in x. If Pr  xj X  0:5 for all x, Xi = xH . Otherwise, call
Xi the maximum value of x such that Pr
 
xj X  0:5 and we get that Pr  xj X  0:5 if and only
if x  Xi .
Second statement: For X in a neighborhood of X0i, Ji(x) is close to 0:5, so a continuity
argument shows that the adjudicator follows the legislation, with Pr
 
xj X > 0:5 if and only if
x  X. Moreover, for X < X0i, Pr
 









, which is larger than 0.5.
Up to which point X do we have Pr
 
xj X  0:5? Owing to the quasi-concavity of fi,




is also weakly decreasing in
X for X > X0i. Hence, using (12), Pr
 
xj X is weakly decreasing in X for X > X0i. Either
Pr
 
xj X  0:5 for all x 2 [X0i; xH ] (in which case we dene XH = xH) or there is some maxi-
mum value of X, call it XH , that satises Pr
 
xj X  0:5.
Since Ji is decreasing in x, as long as Pr
 
xj X  0:5, it must be that Pr  xj X  0:5 for x  X.
It follows that adjudicator i deems legal any x  X as long as X  XH , with XH 2 [X0i; xH ].
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For X > X0i, lim!0+ Pr
 









, which is smaller than 0.5.
Up to which point X do we have lim!0+ Pr
 
X + j X < 0:5? For X in a neighborhood of
X0i, the adjudicator follows the legislation, hence lim!0+ Pr
 
X + j X < 0:5. Since Pr(goodj X)
is increasing in X for X0i < X, 1  Pr(goodj X) is decreasing in X for X0i < X. Moreover, Ji is
decreasing in x. Using (12), we get that lim!0+ Pr
 
X + j X is decreasing in X for X > X0i.
Thus either lim!0+ Pr
 
X + j X < 0:5 for all x 2 [xL; X0i] (in which case we dene XL = xL)
or there is some minimum value of X, call it XL, that satises lim!0+ Pr
 
X + j X  0:5.
Since Ji is decreasing in x, as long as lim!0+ Pr
 
X + j X < 0:5, it must be that Pr  xj X <
0:5 for x > X. It follows that adjudicator i deems illegal any x > X as long as X > XL, with
XL 2 [0; X0i].
Third statement: For X < XL, lim!0+ Pr
 
X + j X > 0:5. Using (12), clearly Pr(xj X) > 0:5
for x  X. Since Ji is decreasing in x, the e¤ective threshold Xi is the maximum value that solves




< 0:5 for X < X0i
(since Ji(X0i) = 0:5 and `(X0i) = 0). Owing to the strict quasi-concavity of fi, Pr(goodj X) is
strictly increasing in X for X < X0i. Using (12), we get that an increase in Pr(goodj X) reduces
Pr(xj X) for x > X, hence it decreases the value Xi that solves Pr( Xi j X) = 0:5. The proof of
the fourth statement is analogous.
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